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ABSTRACT 
 
The petrochemical industry is subject to various federal and local regulations and 
requirements that are challenging to meet and resource intensive. Time and human 
factors often lead to a “check box” mentality where requirements are fully complied with 
“on paper” with little or no emphases on quality of compliance. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements are 
often exposed to this “check box” mentality, especially the Process Hazard Analysis 
(PHA) element which is the engine that drives and affects the whole PSM program. Poor 
implementation of PHA affects mechanical integrity, operating procedures, training, and 
emergency response; and is considered a root cause of most major incidents. 
Unfortunately, poor quality PHAs are widespread, hard to identify and can be more 
dangerous than conducting no PHA at all since it may provide a false sense of safety. 
Unfortunately, existing literature as well as recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) do not provide sufficient guidelines for assessing 
PHA quality. The guidelines proposed in this thesis help in properly auditing PHA 
studies by identifying traps and bad practices that most companies fall into when 
performing PHAs.  
The resulting guidelines are developed based on detailed incident investigation 
reports where root causes included inadequate PHA performance. In addition, expert 
opinion expressed in published papers highlighting specific gaps in PHA performance, 
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and best practices of PHA implementation are utilized to identify common gaps and 
means for auditors to acquire evidence of reduced quality. 
The biggest contributors to the reduction of PHA quality include failing to 
consider lessons learned previous incidents, reduced quality of PHA inputs such as 
process safety information, competence of the PHA team members in their respective 
fields and time allocated for them to complete the PHA, accounting for human factors 
when relying on operator action to return the process to its safe state, as well as failing to 
perform PHAs for non-routine mode of operations. These contributors and others are 
discussed thoroughly on how they affect quality of PHAs and how auditors would obtain 
evidence that supports lack of quality.  
The proposed guidelines compiled in Appendix A should be used as part of an 
overall PSM audit. Using these guidelines by themselves would result in an incomplete 
assessment of the PHA. This is due to the fact that effective PHA element 
implementation depends on several other PSM elements that are considered foundational 
to PHA implementation quality. Spending the time and money to perform an audit 
utilizing these guidelines should be seen as a positive investment by facility’s executives 
as it will unquestionably assist in saving a lot of money and ensure business continuity 
by closing the gaps in PHA performance and reducing the chance for the “check box” 
mentality, thus making their facilities, employees, community and assets safer. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The petrochemical industry is subject to various with federal and local 
regulations and requirements that are challenging to meet and resource intensive. Time 
and human factors often lead to a “check box” mentality where requirements are fully 
complied with “on paper” with little or no emphases on quality of compliance [7]. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management 
(PSM) requirements are often exposed to this “check box” mentality, especially the 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) element which is the engine that drives and affects the 
whole PSM program [6]. Poor implementation of PHA affects mechanical integrity, 
operating procedures, training, and emergency response [6] (see Figure 1); and is 
considered a root cause of most major incidents. Unfortunately, poor quality PHAs are 
widespread, hard to identify and can be more dangerous than conducting no PHA at all 
since it may provide a false sense of safety. A classic example is the BP Texas City 
incident where the Management of Change (MOC) team were not trained on how to 
perform a building siting analysis as part of the MOC PHA procedure [8].  In addition, 
the PHA conducted on the isomerization unit indicated that a tower overfill scenario is 
not credible [8], which resulted in poor maintenance of critical tower level detectors. In 
this case, safety requirements were followed on paper. However, quality of 
implementation was poor. Unfortunately, existing literature as well as recognized and 
generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) do not provide sufficient 
guidelines for assessing PHA quality. The purpose of this thesis is to develop guidelines 
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to properly audit PHA exercises which would help in identifying traps and bad practices 
that most companies fall into when performing PHAs. 
 
  
Figure 1: Effects of PHA on PSM Elements. Reprinted from [6]. 
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2. OBJECTIVES 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop guidelines to thoroughly audit the PHA 
exercises, which would help in identifying traps and bad practices that most companies 
fall into when performing PHAs. The audit guidelines developed would be in a survey 
format with questions that focus on assessing the quality of the PHA reports and auditing 
the implementation of OSHA’s PSM PHA element. The guidelines developed in this 
thesis should be used as part of an overall PSM audit. Using these guidelines by 
themselves would result in an incomplete assessment of the PHA. This is due to the fact 
that PHA element implementation depends on several other PHA elements that are 
considered foundational to the PHA implementation quality. A typical survey would 
include questions, comments/findings, score, and weight reflecting the effect each 
question has on the overall PHA element implementation performance.   
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3. MAJOR INCIDENTS THAT UNDERSCORE THE PROBLEM 
 
The OSHA PSM standard has been mandated since 1992 [9]. Yet, insufficient 
compliance can still be witnessed and incidents with PHA-related issues still continue to 
occur. 21 out of the 46 (43%) detailed investigation reports, published by the U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) between 1998 and 2008, had 
questionable issues pertaining to PHAs [10]. Out of these 21 cases, nine (43%) had no 
PHA conducted at all, eight (38%) did not incorporate lessons learned from previous 
incidents in their PHAs, six (21%) cases had PHA recommendations that were not 
implemented, four (19%) had PHAs which prescribed inadequate safeguards, four (19%) 
did not identify all hazardous scenarios, three (14%) had PHAs which did not consider 
facility siting, three (14%) did misestimated scaled up risk from lab experiments, and 
three others had various other PHA related issues [10]. 
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Figure 2: PHA Issues identified in CSB investigation reports published from 1998 to 
2008. Adapted from [10]. 
 
As can be concluded from Figure 2, almost half of the major incidents in industry 
most probably had PHA-related root causes identified in their investigation reports. For 
example, the DPC Enterprises incident (at Glendale, Arizona in 2003), which resulted in 
the exposure of 11 police officers and five community residents to chlorine as well as the 
complete evacuation of a 1.5 square-mile-area in covering Glendale and Phoenix, had 
several PHA deficiencies. The CSB investigation revealed that the PHAs conducted did 
not identify over-chlorination of the scrubber system as a credible failure scenario (see 
Figure 3). As a result, no adequate safeguards were specified and DPC relied on 
administrative controls only to reduce the likelihood of the over-chlorination scenario 
which was a well-known scenario to facility operators. [4]  
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Another example is the incident that occurred at Honeywell International, Inc. 
(Honeywell) plant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The accidental chlorine gas release led to 
the injury of seven employees and a shelter-in-place advisory notification to the 
residents living within a half mile radius. The CSB investigation revealed that a tube, in 
the shell and tube type cooler, leaked into the chlorine cooling system, damaging the 
pump since it was not designed for handling chlorine. The damage to the pump led to the 
release of chlorine to the atmosphere (see Figure 4). The investigation identified 
inadequate PHA implementation as one of the main root causes of the incident.  The 
PHA conducted did not consider the chlorine cooling system since it was considered a 
utility/support system, missing the opportunity to identify such a scenario. As a result, 
only generic safeguards were prescribed such as “design”, “inspection”, and “testing”. 
[5] 
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Figure 3: Chlorine Loading and Scrubber System at DPC. Adapted from [4]. 
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A more recent example is the incident that occurred at Williams Geismar Olefins 
Plant in Geismar, Louisiana in 2013. The overpressure of a standby reboiler (heat 
exchanger) for the propylene fractionator column caused a boiling liquid expanding 
vapor explosion (BLEVE), which led to the fatality of two employees and the injury of 
167 others. The CSB investigation revealed that the reboiler’s propane feed and 
discharge valves were isolated, which led to the lack of protection needed from the 
column’s pressure relief valve. The steam feed valve to the reboiler was opened causing 
the temperature and pressure of the trapped propane to increase substantially causing the 
BLEVE (see Figure 5). The investigation identified inadequate PHA implementation as 
one of the main root causes of the incident. The PHA conducted did not prescribe 
adequate safeguards for non-routine mode of operation for the reboiler. In addition, the 
prescribed safeguard (which was locking the propane discharge valve open) was never 
implemented for the damaged reboiler even though it was indicated to be completed on 
paper. These examples and many others underscore the importance of ensuring that 
PHAs are properly implemented. 
Chlorine 
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Tube Side 
Shell Side 
Coolant  
Tank 
 Chlorine Leak 
Chlorine Cooler 
Figure 4: Chlorine Loading and Cooling System at Honeywell. Adapted 
from [5]. 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis will utilize the lessons learned from the detailed incident investigation 
reports published by CSB to fortify the proposed PHA auditing guidelines later produced 
in this thesis. It is true that there are several incident databases available to the public. 
However, detailed incident reports are limited as most databases do not include detailed 
incident investigation reports that dig deep enough to identify PHA-related issues. Even 
the ones that had incident investigation reports, the quality of these reports is quite often 
questionable. Excellent reports do exist, but they are not often shared, sometimes even 
within the company, due to legal notifications and liability issues. Perhaps, this is part of 
the reason why we still continue to make the same mistakes. The reports by the CSB are 
the exception, not only because they were created by qualified teams, but also because 
the team was unbiased and independent. In addition, major incidents that caught the 
Propylene 
Fractionator 
Reboiler B 
(Shell and tube) 
Reflux Drum 
Propylene Product 
Propane Feed 
Propane Recycle 
Quench Water 
System 
Steam 
Figure 5: Propylene fractionator at Williams. Adapted from [3]. 
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attention of the media such as Bhopal and Piper Alpha will also have quality detailed 
incident investigation reports and could provide some insights into how to audit the 
quality of PHAs. By taking these facts into consideration, this thesis focuses on incident 
reports produced by the CSB and major incidents that caught the attention of extensive 
studies and investigation such as Bhopal and Piper Alpha.   
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The survey questions will be formed based on the information gathered from: 
1) Detailed incident investigation reports where root causes include inadequate 
PHA performance,  
2) Expert opinion expressed in published papers about specific aspects related to 
PHA auditing,  
3) And literature review consisting of best practices of PHA implementation and 
PHA element execution. 
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5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature available which enable auditors to assess the quality of risk 
assessments are surprisingly scarce. Perhaps due to the huge amount of regulations that 
govern petrochemical plants safety and the inherent conflict between short-term 
financial goals with safety goals, most of the industry reacts to most safety enhancement 
endeavors by implementing only the bare minimum. Safety professionals are often faced 
by that most common of phrases “Is it mandatory?; if it is, then show me the regulation 
that mandates it” without even considering the potential of safety enhancements or long-
term financial goals which often coincide. As Dr. Trevor Kletz once said: 
 “There’s an old saying that if you think safety is expensive, try an accident. 
Accidents cost a lot of money. And, not only in damage to plant and in claims for injury, 
but also in the loss of the company’s reputation.”  
As a result of this constant conflict between safety and short-term financial goals, 
most literature available contains guidelines backed up by existing regulations. The issue 
is that most regulations are reactive, governmental, and/or legislative responses to major 
incidents or catastrophes. Thus, these regulations are not always comprehensive. 
Moderate or minor incidents do not always trigger a new regulation to control the risk, 
even if it had the potential to have much higher consequences. Another reason why 
regulations may not always be comprehensive is that creating a regulation requires 
enormous resources to ensure proper monitoring and enforcement, especially when a 
regulation applies to a whole country with small and big businesses. So, it may not 
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always be practical to create a regulation. Therefore, the majority of PHA auditing 
knowhow exists in the form of company internal processes/procedures, or is embedded 
into the minds of experienced employees who do not always have the time to document 
or publish their knowledge. In addition, due to the qualitative nature of most of the 
available risk assessment techniques, PHAs prove to be often elusive and difficult to 
audit. 
A good example of risk assessment auditing guidelines resource which is based 
on existing regulations is the Guidelines for Auditing PSM Systems developed by the 
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Chapter 10, which contains guidelines on 
auditing Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis studies, mostly includes guidelines 
based on federal regulations such as OSHA and EPA regulations for PSM and RMP, 
respectively. Their developed guidelines do also incorporate state regulations such as 
New Jersey, California, and Delaware as well. However, they are not comprehensive 
enough and they do not focus on quality of implementation of PHA. They do give 
guidelines for auditing the overall performance of the PHA element implementation. For 
example, this resource does not adequately address the experience validation 
requirements of PHA team members and other sources of variance such as the inaccurate 
assessment of risk. 
  Another resource identified was a paper written by Thomas R. Moss, the 
managing director of RM Consultants Ltd. (RMC) at the time of the paper. In his paper 
titled, “Auditing Offshore Safety Risk Assessments,” he created an audit process based on 
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his review of the RMC’s internal quality-assurance procedures. His proposed and later 
tested process was as follows [12]: 
1) The PHAs are reviewed to determine the scope and objectives to evaluate the 
methodology, assumptions and data used.  
2) Previous relevant incidents in the offshore incident databases are reviewed to 
determine completeness of input data used by the PHA team.  
3) PHA records as well as resulting procedures and recommendations are reviewed 
to verify if hazardous simulations operations (SIMOPS) are taken into 
consideration.  
4) The PHA is reviewed in detail to ensure that data, assumptions, methodology, 
calculations, models, and consequence/probability assessments are complete and 
accurate. 
5) The adequacy of safeguards proposed during SIMOPS is reviewed. 
6) The results of the audit are discussed and areas of uncertainty are highlighted.     
As can be seen from Moss’s proposed process, it is limited to the work flow of 
auditing offshore facilities, yet it can be applied to onshore facilities as well. However, 
his procedure is not detailed enough to help identify the traps and bad practices which 
most facilities fall into when performing PHAs, nor does it highlight telltale signs that 
assist the auditor in identifying systematic issues in the PHA element. Moss’ process 
also precedes the introduction of the PSM regulation.   
Other available literature focus on the best practices, techniques, and formats of 
auditing SMS systems which are outside the focus of this thesis. However, there are 
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several other resources containing guidelines and best practices for conducting PHAs 
such as Frank Crawley and Brian Tyler’s book titled “HAZOP: Guide to Best Practices”  
and many other books developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 
such as the one titled “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety”. These resources can 
be specific to a certain PHA methodology or general to most used ones. These guidelines 
are utilized in sections 6 and 7 below to develop PHA auditing guidelines in this thesis.   
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6. SOURCES OF VARIANCE 
 
Sources of variance in quality of PHAs are always the result of variance in PHA 
inputs, mainly process safety information, incident and near miss investigation results, as 
well as input provided by the PHA team members which is derived from their 
experience [6] (see Figure 1). Poor PHA inputs can render the whole study invalid, lead 
to overdesigning or under designing the process. All these consequences lead to financial 
ramifications such as redoing PHA studies, paying extra for overdesigned safe guards 
acquisition, installation, and maintenance; incident damage when hazard scenarios are 
missed; interruption in business continuity; environmental remediation; and/or lawsuits, 
among others. Therefore, minimizing the input variance and increasing the input quality 
is essential to the overall quality of a PHA and the overall safety and business continuity.  
 
6.1. Incomplete List of PHA Input Sources 
The first step is to ensure that all information is incorporated in a PHA. To some, 
this step might seem obvious and wonder why/how a lot of companies still fall short of 
completing this very basic yet extremely important step. As previously mentioned 38% 
of incidents investigated by the CSB between 1998 and 2008 failed to include lessons 
learned from previous incidents, even though it is an OSHA requirement [10]. The issue 
might lie in the fact that OSHA is not specific on the scope of incidents that needs to be 
included in the analyses during a PHA. For example, should the analysis include 
incidents that occurred only within the facility? Or should it include other incidents that 
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occurred at other facilities within the company with similar processes? Should even 
consider incidents that occurred in other companies? OSHA does not specify [10]. 
Kaszniak’s review revealed that some PHAs failed to include previous incidents within 
the same process (i.e., BP Amoco Polymers), some failed to includes ones that occurred 
at similar processes in the same facility (e.g., BP Texas City), others failed to include 
incidents that occurred at similar processes at other facilities within the same company 
(e.g., Formosa, IL). 
In addition, most experts agree that most companies are not 100% compliant in 
implementing the PSM regulations. For example, depending on the safety culture, some 
may not report all incidents or near-misses if that might get them into trouble. Due to 
company culture, process upsets might not be considered as near-misses. Time pressure 
and lack of manpower might make some people ignore near-miss investigations all 
together, missing the opportunity to identify some residual risk that went unidentified in 
previous PHAs. Yet, evidence of these incidents or near-misses might still be available 
in the form of emergency maintenance work orders. Reviewing emergency work orders 
is also helpful in giving the PHA team an idea about some the actual equipment failure 
frequency when evaluating risk. That is why emergency maintenance work orders 
should always be part of a PHA input, even if it might seem redundant.  
The same can be said about corrosion inspection worksheets. They also may 
indicate the existence of a previous incident. However, they do also identify nodes or 
types of equipment prone to corrosion or deterioration. In addition, they can help in 
prioritizing nodes or parts of a plant that has a higher risk of failure from corrosion. 
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Again, redundancy of information helps reduce the size of gaps in terms of information 
completeness.   
Another example is Management of Change (MOC). It is no surprise to most 
safety professionals that MOC implementation has not been perfect in many companies. 
For example, the level of review determined for the MOC was not sufficient and the 
impact on the health and safety might have been underestimated. The risk assessment of 
a complex change might have been reviewed by an unqualified or incomplete team. In 
fact, many of the issues that affect the quality of a PHA affect MOCs as well. So, there 
might be some residual risk unidentified or underestimated. Therefore, it is crucial to 
include MOCs as part of a PHA revalidation exercise even if it might seem redundant.  
Another important source of information is pre-startup safety reviews action 
items. Poor safety culture can lead to plant startups without completing all critical action 
items. Inspectors may often put a lot of time and effort in finding issues like 
standards/regulations exceptions, issues requiring further studies, and other team 
recommendations [11]. Findings may also include incomplete transfer of process 
knowledge (e.g., missing or poor PSI, or training for operators/maintenance personnel). 
These findings can affect the integrity of the design, and reliability of safeguards. 
Therefore, this valuable source of information should be considered in PHAs.    
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Drill critique meetings might also contain significant findings that might affect 
the outcome of PHAs. Findings such as response time, fire truck access, and manual 
isolation valve access comes to mind and needs to be considered during a PHA 
revalidation. 
In addition, the chemical material inventory should always be considered when 
performing a PHA when storage warehouses are part of the facility. The amount and 
reactivity of chemicals stored in these storage facilities could have a tremendous effect 
on the resulting risk. China’s Tianjin incident comes to mind where a chemical 
warehouse fire led to explosions equivalent to 24 tons of TNT, destroyed more than 
5,500 cars [15], injured more than 700 people [16], killed 173, and demolished more 
than 300 homes [17]. This is not an isolated case. In China alone, similar incidents led to 
more than 68,000 deaths in 2014 as reported by the Chinese government [16]. So, not 
only can similar incidents have severe consequences, but high frequency as well, so the 
risk is higher than expected. During PHA revalidations, it is essential to ensure that the 
PHA considered the maximum inventory of chemicals that had been stored in previous 
years and any future plan of increase. Due to low perception of risk of storage facilities, 
this source of information could be easily overlooked.     
As a result, the complete list of PHA inputs that should be considered and 
documented during a PHA should include the following at a minimum: 
1) Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) [18] 
2) Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with material/energy balances [18] 
3) Layout drawings [18] 
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4) Equipment specifications sheets [18] 
5) Process description [19] 
6) Maximum chemical inventory in storage facilities. 
7) Previous PHA* [19] 
8) Incident and near-miss investigation reports* [20] 
9) Emergency work orders* 
10) Inspection worksheets* 
11) MOCs* [20] 
12) Emergency Drill critiques* [20] 
13) Pre-startup safety reviews action items.* 
* Required only during PHA revalidation.  
 
6.2. Quality of PHA Inputs 
The quality and comprehensiveness of the PSI is not only crucial to obtain a 
quality PHA but also for the overall design, training, operation, maintenance, and MOC 
of the whole facility. The Process Safety Information (PSI) element is one of the 
foundational elements affecting the whole PSM system [21]. Therefore, it is imperative 
that this element is thoroughly audited as part of the whole PHA quality audit. Usually, 
due to time and manpower constraints, auditors are only able to verify that P&IDs used 
in the PHA were up-to-date and as-built at the time of the PHA report. This is usually 
the case when a PHA is audited separately and not as part of a complete PSM audit. 
However, due to the criticality of the PSI element to the quality of the PHA, it should be 
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audited exhaustively. The same could be said to some extent about the MOC, and 
incident investigation elements. Since they would be considered inputs to the PHA, they 
should have their own full blown audits and the results should be used to revise the 
overall score of PHA element. For example, if the incident investigation element was 
audited and scored only 20% implementation, it stands to reason that the overall score of 
the PHA element cannot be 100% or anything close to 100%. A similar argument can be 
made about the PSI element where gaps and/or inaccuracies were identified; a low audit 
score in PSI should automatically affect the score of the PHA element because of the 
inherent interconnectedness.  
Some audit guidelines can be recommended in this section. However, it is not 
advised to use them in lieu of a comprehensive audit of other relevant elements such as 
the PSI and incident investigation. Having a CAD drafter as part of audit team can be 
huge asset to ensure comprehensiveness of the review.  
1) Check pre-startup safety reviews for any pending action items or closed items 
regarding PSI and verify closure through field verification and/or interviews. 
2) Check previous PHAs for comments regarding lack or inaccuracy of PSI.  
3) Interview PHA team members and inquire about any missing information or 
inaccuracies identified during the PHA [20].   
4) Interview process engineers, plant operators, and maintenance engineers and 
inquire about any missing information or inaccuracies they encounter in PSI.  
5) Check MOCs which needed PSI updates and verify that information were 
updated prior to the PHA.  
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6) The auditor should review the incident databases of similar facilities; especially 
other facilities belonging to the same company and verify if they had been 
incorporated in the PHA. If several facilities exist under the same company, 
sometime they do operate in silos and lessons learned from other facilities are not 
communicated or implemented.  
7) Verify that the PSK system exist that ensures that PSI are complete, accurate, and 
up-to-date and captures any changes to the PSI [11]. 
8) Verify that an MOC system exist that meets the requirements of the PSM.  
9) Interview personnel and inquire about any recent changes to the process and 
verify that all these changes went through the MOC process and associated PSI 
were updated as necessary.  
10) Reduce overall score of PHA implementation if MOC, PSI, or incident 
investigation elements audit scores are below 80%.    
11) Review any previous internal/external or third party audit reports to find any 
relevant issues.    
 
6.3. Inaccurate Assessment of Risk 
One of the greatest strengths of a PHA is its systematic structure which aids the 
team in determining an initiating event that has the potential to create an incident 
(credible scenario). However, if the PHA is qualitative in nature (e.g., HAZOP), the task 
of determining the risk of a credible scenario becomes susceptible to inaccuracy, 
inconsistency and a source of disagreement between team members. Utilizing accurate 
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incident frequency figures and consequence estimation will heavily influence the overall 
assessment of risk for a potential incident and the level of safeguards required to 
mitigate it. Factors that may influence the accuracy of risk estimation are discussed in 
the sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. 
6.3.1. Inaccurate Assessment of Frequency  
There are many sources for frequency data. Some PHA teams utilize historical 
records or even generic failure frequency databases to determine the overall risk of the 
identified hazards. Some might rely solely on their experience to determine the 
frequency. This major source of variance can result in gross underestimation or 
overestimation of risk.  
6.3.1.1. Historical Data 
As per the Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis 
(CPQRA) developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety, historical records 
should only be utilized to determine the frequency of an initiating event if the data is 
derived from sufficiently similar facilities [22]. In addition, if the applications were 
deemed similar, historical data should also be reviewed to determine similarity of 
conditions like fluid aggressiveness, temperature, pressure, and vibration [23].  
6.3.1.2. Generic Failure Data 
It is easy to understand why some risk assessors use generic failure data in their 
risk assessments. However, there are issues with these generic databases that have to be 
taken into consideration when evaluating risks. Most of the generic failure rate databases 
are outdated [24]. Some of the failure data resources were originally published in the 
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1970s [25]. Updated manufacturing standards, changes in maintenance and operation 
practices, and the added number of failures in the last 50 years could have changed the 
average frequency of failure used in these databases [24]. It is difficult to ascertain that 
these generic frequency values are still representative of the current equipment failure 
trends. In addition, some studies reveal that real failure rates tend to be higher than some 
failure databases such as the Purple book [24]. 
In addition, it may be necessary to adjust these data based on the differences in 
operational and environmental conditions [25]. Unfortunately, not all generic databases 
define the operation and environmental conditions of the collected data [25].  
Yet, generic data can be one of the few options especially during the initial 
design. Reviewing generic failure databases during every PHA is impractical and takes a 
lot of time and experience. In addition, members of the team may spend a significant 
amount of time arguing about the failure rate values. So, it is expected that large 
companies, especially the ones that have huge resources and similar process facilities, 
develop their own incident databases. At least, generic databases should be reviewed, 
complied, and modified to produce an internal failure rate handbook that suits the 
company’s operational and environmental conditions. Small companies should consider 
the latter route as well especially since over/under-estimating the risk could lead to huge 
financial burdens. However, reviewing generic data when required for a PHA could 
prove more practical for smaller companies. Both small and large companies are 
expected to revalidate these failure estimates during PHA revalidation.  
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6.3.2. Inaccurate Assessment of Consequences 
Initially during a PHA study, the team must consider the worst-case credible 
consequence for a given scenario without considering the effects of any existing 
safeguard/s [20].Some PHA teams fall into the trap of assessing the consequence of a 
given scenario while considering the effects of safeguards in place. For example, a team 
might not consider overpressure damage of a vessel as a worst-case consequence if they 
have considered the installed relief valve, which gives them a false risk estimate. This 
often happens with inexperienced teams while performing revalidation PHA studies. The 
auditor must validate that the initial risk assessment of identified scenarios have been 
considered without considering safeguards [20].  
6.3.3. Experience 
Relying on one’s experience has its limitations, especially when approximating 
the likelihood of rare initiating events unless the person’s experience covered a sufficient 
number of plants with similar design, equipment, and applications which is usually rare. 
So even if the team had a collectively long experience, they might still dismiss the 
probability of rare events happening entirely. So it is vital that the team use historical 
and generic data rather than depending on their own experience for extremely rare 
events. The team’s experience is more useful in reviewing generic data and estimating 
the likelihood of events if no previous data exist for incidents that are considered 
frequent. Generally, the more often the incident occurs the more accurate the 
experienced team’s estimate can be in estimating the probability and consequence of an 
initiating event, see Figure 6 below.  
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Therefore, if the auditor finds out that the team relied on their experience to 
estimate the risk of most rare events without relying on any generic or historical data, 
then quality of their estimates should be deemed inadequate.  
  
6.4. Risk Acceptance Criteria 
It is essential that the risk acceptance criteria and tools used to evaluate risk 
against them are well defined and established prior to performing a PHA. Some of the 
less than adequate practices seen in the PHA field include the following: 
1) Some facilities do not provide any risk acceptance criteria or tools to the PHA 
team, asking them only to identify hazardous initiating events and safeguards. 
This is grossly inadequate unless the initiating events identified and safe guards 
proposed by the team are evaluated later by a competent risk assessment team 
against risk acceptance criteria. This approach has some advantages and 
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Figure 6: Event frequency versus experienced estimate accuracy 
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disadvantages. It can lead to increased focus and efficiency on what the team 
does best, identifying initiating events. In most cases, not all team members have 
adequate experience/knowledge in assessing risk against a defined criteria, which 
may lead to disagreement and long discussions that may delay or reduce the 
accuracy of risk assessment, especially if the tool used is qualitative (e.g., risk 
matrix). However, this approach is incomplete by itself and has to be 
supplemented by a separate risk assessment exercise by a competent team.    
2) Some facilities do not provide any risk acceptance criteria or tools to the PHA 
team and asks them to use their own (if PHA is conducted by a contractor) or use 
one from the internet. Unfortunately, this practice is common and has many 
issues that makes it a completely unacceptable practice, chief among which: 
(a) This practice leads to a high probability of variability in assessment of risk in 
each PHA study. An initiating event might be deemed acceptable in one tool 
but unacceptable in another. A safeguard prescribed might also be deemed 
adequate in one tool but inadequate in another.  
(b) This practice increases the responsibility on the PHA team and dilutes the 
responsibility of facility management to develop their risk acceptance criteria. 
Facility management should develop risk acceptance criteria that suit their risk 
acceptance profile and they should be aware of the consequences of the 
criteria they decide on, especially since they have a significant leadership role 
in dealing directly with the consequences of an incident.    
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Therefore, it is essential for facility management to develop/approve proper risk 
acceptance criteria that ensures profitability without compromising the environment and 
human life. The risk tolerance criteria should include at least the following [26]: 
1) Maximum allowable risk per initiating event. 
2) Maximum allowable risk per node or area. 
The defined risk tolerance criteria should include all relevant types of risk (e.g., 
human life, assets, health, environment), and differentiate between voluntary and 
involuntary risk (employee risk vs. community risk). The maximum allowable risk 
defined for the community or facility surroundings should be much more conservative 
when compared to allowable employee risk. The decided upon risk tolerance criteria 
should be approved and signed by facility management to ensure their involvement, 
commitment, and ownership. The auditor should also make sure that the maximum 
allowable risk threshold defined is reasonable. As a general rule, an employee should not 
be exposed to more risk at work than voluntary risk taken during activities off work [27]. 
For societal risk, the risk is considered generally acceptable by the public if the risk of 
fatality is less than 10
-6
 fatality per person/year, which is the risk of fatal injury from 
natural hazards [28]. The risk is considered generally unacceptable to the public if the 
risk of fatality is higher than 10
-3
 fatality per person/year, which is the risk of fatal injury 
from disease [28]. So, usually the maximum allowable societal risk is between 10
-6
 and 
10
-3
 fatality per person/year. UK’s Health and Safety Executive stipulates that the risk of 
death from an industrial incident to the public should not exceed 50 fatalities in 5,000 
years per annum [29]. 
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Facility management is also expected to assign the responsibility of designing 
and customizing their risk assessment tools (e.g., risk matrix) to a competent team and 
review/approve them. The design goals of the risk assessment tool should include the 
following: 
1) Limit subjectivity. 
2) Reduce user errors. 
3) Assist user/s in accurately assessing the risk of an initiating event and comparing 
it to the risk acceptance criteria.  
4) Assist user/s in ranking risks in order to prioritize proposed PHA 
recommendation implementation.  
5) Assist user/s in accurately assessing the effect of proposed safeguards on 
identified hazardous scenarios and its adequacy to reduce the risk to ALARP. 
 
If the tool used in the PHA was found to deviate from these design goals, the tool 
should be deemed substandard. For example, signs of a less than adequate risk matrix 
include: 
1) Descriptions of consequence categories do not include either loss of life, 
financial loss, or environmental loss. The team should consider loss in all 
consequence types. 
2) Quantitative descriptions are not available to define probability and consequence 
categories. Using quantitative descriptions, such as anchor points and ranges, to 
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describe a probability or consequence category would greatly assist in reducing 
subjectivity and bias among the PHA team [30]. 
3) Resolution of matrix is too small (e.g., 3x3) and does not cover the range of 
credible scenario probability and consequence. The resolution of the risk matrix 
should consider the range of consequence (from the maximum to the minimum 
credible scenario) and probability (range relevant to the PHA) [30].  
4) Ranges of frequency and consequence are not adequate. For example, major 
incidents consequences should range from loss time injury to multiple fatalities. 
For likelihood, the range should be from 1 per year to at least 1/10000 per year. 
[1] 
5) Coloring of risk matrix is not defined. Each color should be clearly defined in 
terms of risk acceptability, and the ALARP region should be identified [30].   
6) Risk acceptance criteria are not defined quantitatively. Reliance on coloring only 
in a risk matrix will lead to risk evaluation ties and prevent the team from 
properly ranking hazardous scenarios [30].  
 
6.5. Initiation Criteria for more Quantitative Methodologies 
At the other end of the spectrum, establishing criteria that triggers the need for 
more quantitative risk assessment methodologies is even more important than deciding 
on the risk acceptance criteria. When the potential consequences are huge, 
methodologies that lack accuracy are unacceptable because small errors still translate to 
significant consequences. Therefore, it is essential that corporate requirements stipulate 
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the initiation criteria for more quantitative risk assessment methodologies when 
performing a PHA. Examples for such triggers can be estimated consequences (e.g., 
major injury, fatality, societal injury, environmental toxic release), risk, complexity of 
the process, type of material/chemical processed, or a combination [11]. In addition, 
corporate requirements should stipulate the methodologies accepted for the established 
triggers and the level of detail required [11]. For example, if during the PHA a hazardous 
scenario identified was estimated to cause major injuries to the surrounding community, 
the team would have to perform a separate QRA study for that specific scenario. This 
would help in accurately estimating the risk and in deciding on adequate safeguards that 
would reduce the likelihood of the scenario and reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 
The auditor should first ensure that corporate requirements stipulate the initiation 
criteria for more quantitative risk assessment methodologies while performing PHAs, 
and the accepted methodologies suitable for the specific initiation criterion. The auditor 
should then verify implementation of these requirements in the PHA. It is not 
uncommon that the PHA team specifies a recommendation to perform a more 
quantitative methodology (e.g., QRA, LOPA) for a specific scenario instead of 
performing the methodology themselves during the PHA. This can be due to time 
factors, and lack of qualifications required to perform such studies due to its complexity. 
This is acceptable. However, it is not acceptable that the recommendation is closed by 
performing the quantitative study only. The auditor should ensure that these types of 
recommendations are only closed if the specified recommendations in the resulting 
quantitative study are performed, and not by merely conducting the study. This is 
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essential because of two important factors. PHA recommendations are usually high level 
items that are tracked by upper management and given high priority. Closing the 
recommendation to perform additional studies by merely performing the study may lead 
to the resulting recommendations of the additional study being untracked or having 
lower priority.         
 
6.6. Inaccurate Assessment of Safeguards Effect 
One of the crucial steps of a HAZOP study is the reevaluation of risk with 
existing safeguards or ones that are recommended by the team. Several HAZOP teams 
skip this step entirely due to the time consuming discussions it takes for the team to 
agree on the effects. Yet without performing this step, the team cannot determine or 
demonstrate whether the introduced or existing safeguards are sufficient to reduce the 
risk of the hazard identified to the ALARP region in the risk matrix. Sometimes two, 
three or even more safeguards are needed to mitigate a hazard.   
In addition, an inexperienced team could introduce invalid safeguards. Examples 
of invalid safeguards are the following [18]: 
1) A safeguard that requires a rushed operator intervention unfeasible by the 
operator due to a lack of time or inaccessibility (e.g., isolation valve located very 
close to a leak/fire, or isolation valve which requires a scaffold to access);   
2) “Operator Awareness;” 
3) “Never had a problem with it to-date;” 
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4) Using a vessel sight glass with a media that causes fouling of glass, making it 
difficult to determine the true level;  
5) Using a component from the same failed loop/system as a safe guard.  
Furthermore, some may inaccurately reevaluate the risk with proposed/existing 
safeguards. One of the most common signs which reveal lack of knowledge in risk 
assessment is the reduction of risk in both the probability and consequence axes when 
evaluating the effect of a safeguard. Risk is rarely reduced in both probability and 
consequence [31].A safeguard such as a level alarm will reduce the likelihood, not the 
consequence. A dike constructed to limit the size of spillage area would reduce the 
consequence, not the probability. If inaccurate assessment of safeguards exists 
throughout the report, this would be a clear sign that the team is not fully competent. 
Therefore, even if the team/leader had substantial evidence of training and long 
experience, misestimating the effect of safeguards on risk is a clear sign that they still 
lack some of the necessary competence. Inaccurate assessment of safeguard effects on 
risk calls into question the credibility of the PHA significantly since it would most 
probably lead to substantial underestimation of real risk, which means that facility 
employees are less safe than they think they are.    
6.6.1. Considering Operator Action 
Operator actions are often relied on to reduce risk in two types of responses. The 
first is the initiation and implementation of emergency response activities if the process 
could not be controlled after exceeding the process safety parameters. The second 
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response is controlling the process to return it to its safe state after exceeding the process 
safety parameters. [32] 
If the auditor notices that the PHA team did consider operator action to reduce 
risk, then he/she has to examine two factors:  
1) The direction in which risk is reduced (i.e., along the probability axis or the 
consequence axis).  
2) The magnitude of reduction along the axis.  
In the first type of response where the operator is relied on to initiate and 
implement emergency response activities, reduction is only expected in the consequence 
axis since loss of containment has already occurred at this stage and any possible 
reduction can be in the consequences (e.g., community evacuation, cooling nearby 
structures, taking the injured to nearby medical facilities). The magnitude of reduction 
will depend on several factors (e.g., type of consequence, resources, access, and 
communication) and should be looked at on a case-by-case basis. So, if auditors discover 
that the PHA team reduced risk on the probability axis on this type of response, quality 
score of PHA should be reduced.  
In the second type of response where the operator is relied on to control the 
process and return it to its safe parameters after exceeding them, risk reduction should 
only be expected on the probability axis. As for the magnitude of reduction, the team 
should not reduce the probability of failure by more than a factor of 10 (10
-1
 probability 
of failure on demand), unless the team demonstrates that this particular operator 
response is reliable enough to exceed a reduction factor of 10 using Layer of Protection 
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Analysis (LOPA) or an equivalent methodology. In this analysis, the operator action has 
to meet the intended safety instrumented function (SIF) criteria. In addition, the analysis 
has to demonstrate that the operator can respond correctly to the alarm or process 
indication within the available time to return the process to a safe state. The probability 
of human error for each specific case has to be estimated using sound human error 
evaluation techniques such as the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
and the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program Human Reliability Analysis Procedure 
(ASEP HRA Procedure). In addition, environmental factors (e.g., access, control area 
environment, control layout and quality of displays), stress factors (e.g., shift schedules, 
response time pressure), and personnel factors (e.g., experience, training) has to be 
considered in the analysis to reduce or increase/decrease the nominal human error rates 
estimated through the human error evaluation technique. Using a checklist similar to 
Table 1 could also help demonstrate adequacy of operator action for probability of 
failure reduction of more than a factor of 10. [32] 
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Table 1: Considering Human Factors for Operator Response. Adapted from [32]. 
Human Factor Related Engineering Issues Yes No N/A 
Can the operator action be completed within the required time for the SIF?    
Do operators have immediate access to a specific alarm response 
procedure? 
   
Do operators have sufficient training to complete the required response?    
Do operators receive periodic competency evaluations in the required 
action? 
   
Do operators have the physical ability required to complete the required 
SIF? 
   
Are operators provided with adequate controls and displays required to 
complete the required action? 
   
Does the operator action meet company requirements and procedures and is 
it suitable for the operator experience? 
   
If separate displays exist, do they provide consistent information?    
Does the display action match the actual control movement?    
Does the display provide direct, complete, concise, usable information with 
the required precision without the need for any extra steps? 
   
Is enough information provided to the operator about normal vs. abnormal 
conditions? 
   
Is there a clear indication for any display failure?    
Are displays and controls required for the SIF located/positioned within the 
reach limits of the operators?  
   
Are the alarms required to complete the SIF directly obvious to operators?    
Are the required alarms and controls grouped together for the operator?    
Does the design of the SIF controls ensure minimal human error?    
Is the SIS operator interface located in an area that ensures immediate 
operator attention? 
   
Does the display provided for the operator show that required actions are 
completed (e.g., valve closed, pump turned off)? 
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6.7. PHA Team Competence 
Other major sources of variation and inaccuracy are the PHA team composition, 
expertise, and personal attributes. The PHA team can literally make or break the whole 
PHA. PHA team members with inadequate experience, meager qualifications, and poor 
personal attributes will fail to identify all credible hazard scenarios, inaccurately 
estimate risks for hazardous scenarios, and prescribe poor safeguards [33]. In fact, an 
incompetent team will identify more non-credible and more low consequence hazards 
when compared to a competent team [23]. In addition, an incomplete PHA team could 
lead to similar undesirable results. Some PHA experts insist that the whole PHA is 
redone if the team is not qualified [18]. Having an incomplete team would also lead to 
time delays and reduction in quality since the input of the non-present member would 
have to be added and reviewed by the team at a later stage. Therefore, it is crucial to 
assess the PHA team composition and competency.  
6.7.1. OSHA Requirements for PHA Teams 
In order to adequately audit the competency of a PHA team, it is vital to take into 
account the governmental requirements for the team. OSHA requires the PHA team 
leader to be [34]: 
1) Knowledgeable in the PHA methodology; 
2) Impartial to the plant or project; 
3) Competent in managing the team. 
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OSHA also requires the team to have certain characteristics [34]: 
1) Possess expertise in the following areas or disciplines: “process technology; 
process design; operating procedures and practices; alarms; emergency 
procedures; instrumentation; maintenance procedures, both routine and non-
routine tasks, including how the tasks are authorized; procurement of parts 
and supplies; safety and health; and any other relevant subjects”; 
2) Fully knowledgeable of current “standards, codes, specifications, and 
regulations applicable to the process being studied”;   
3) Compatibility with each other and team leader; 
4) Some members will be full-time members while others can be part-time 
members only. 
In addition, a letter of interpretation of the PSM standard by OSHA indicated that 
an OSHA representative may elect to interview team members and/or leader and review 
their training history, whether formal, informal, or on-the-job training, to verify their 
competence based on the aforementioned requirements [35]. So, although the PSM 
standard does not specifically require training for the PHA team members and leader, 
OSHA certainly expects it.  
6.7.2. PHA Team Composition 
Verifying the completeness of the PHA team is essential to ensure thoroughness 
and effectiveness of the PHA team in identifying hazardous scenarios. Having members 
with different disciplines, expertise, perspectives, and opinions will contribute to a 
successful PHA analysis. There are many PHA guidelines that recommend different 
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team structures but most agree that there should be some core, and temporary team 
members in a team. It is crucial that the facility defines the minimum PHA team 
composition, and monitor implementation of these requirements. Of course, the team 
structure will depend on the type of industry and process being analyzed and whether it 
is a new project or a PHA revalidation of an existing process. Generally, the team 
composition would be as follows [13]: 
1) PHA Leader; 
2) Scribe; 
3) Process Engineer or Designer; 
4) Project Engineer; 
5) Experienced Operator; 
6) Safety, Health, Environment Expert (as required); 
7) Instrument/control Engineer/Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) Engineer (as 
required); 
8) Mechanical/maintenance engineer knowledgeable in routine and non-routine 
maintenance procedures and tasks (as required)*; 
9) Corrosion inspector/engineer representative (as required)*; 
10) Instrument technician;* 
11) Maintenance/mechanical technician;* 
12) Other specialist/experts in other relevant disciplines (e.g., process technology; 
operating procedures and practices; alarms; emergency procedures; procurement 
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of parts and supplies) as required (Process safety management guidelines for 
compliance. 1994 (Reprinted), 1994). 
*  Most PHA guidelines and best practices generally agree on the general composition of 
the PHA team. However, it is rare that you find a guideline that requires the presence of 
a corrosion inspector, maintenance/mechanical technician, and instrument technician. 
The value of these members is evident especially when validating the frequency of 
failure when using generic data if actual equipment failure data is not properly 
monitored or documented. They would also be able to shed some light on the reliability 
of proposed safeguards. For example, a corrosion inspector would know how often a 
leak would occur and what type of failure usually happen (e.g., pinhole leak, hydrogen 
induced cracking, or microbial corrosion). So, not only would he/she be able to affirm 
the frequency of failure and credible consequence, but he/she would also be able to assist 
in steering the team in the right direction when proposing a suitable safeguard (e.g., 
corrosion inhibitor, or maybe reducing water content). In addition, involving these team 
members in the PHA enhances their awareness of the credible hazardous scenarios and 
consequences in their facility which makes them more mindful of the criticality of some 
safeguards over others, which would subconsciously make them ensure that preventive 
maintenance is performed at an acceptable level. Of course, it is understandable that 
some of these team members are usually very busy and having them as permanent 
members of the team is very difficult or even impractical, so at least they are expected to 
be partial team members in PHAs. 
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6.7.3. PHA Team Qualifications 
As can be deduced from the OSHA requirements mentioned above, the 
mandatory regulations set by the government are limited. The level of expertise and 
knowledge which defines the competency of the team is not clearly stipulated.  Safety 
and risk specialists in process safety and human factors recognize the legislation’s 
limitations and recommend more detailed requirements that match the level of 
importance of a PHA team qualifications [33].  
Ideally, the competency of the team should be verified by reviewing the plant’s 
competency management program [33]. Although this guide mainly focuses on auditing 
implementation of the PHA element, it is necessary to review other elements to properly 
assess implementation of the PHA element. Having a properly established and 
implemented competency management program ensures competency of the team, thus 
allowing quality and consistent PHAs to be produced. It would enable plant managers to 
make informed decisions when choosing team members and produce evidence of PHA 
team qualifications on demand for government auditors and investigators. The absence 
of a competency management program will hinder the verification of the PHA team 
competency and may consequently discredit the whole PHA study. Therefore, it is 
essential to verify that a competency management program is established by the plant in 
the first place. This program would be part of the plant’s PSM training element. The 
program should adequately specify competency requirements and monitor them.  
The competency management program should specify the roles and 
responsibilities of the PHA team members and plant managers, stipulate the level of 
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expertise required for team members depending on the complexity of the process being 
analyzed, and training and expertise required to reach the level of competency desired 
for each PHA team member (classroom or on the job) [21]. In addition, the program 
should specify the required frequency or criteria for refresher training [33], measure, 
monitor, and document the competency of members [33], have the ability to track 
training history of individuals [33], and provide a snapshot of the team members’ 
competency status at the time of the report. The latter is crucial in order to verify that the 
team members were fully qualified at the time of the report and not at a later stage. It is 
also crucial that the assigned competency assessor is also thoroughly competent, 
credible, consistent, and independent [33]. 
6.7.3.1. PHA Team Leader Suggested Competency Criteria: 
A PHA team leader must be thoroughly knowledgeable in the PHA methodology 
and possess exceptional facilitating skills. Table 2 describes suggested traits for a PHA 
team leader. 
6.7.3.2. PHA Scribe Suggested Competency Criteria: 
A PHA scribe must be knowledgeable in the PHA methodology, not just a 
recorder, fluent in the language being used, typing, grammar, spelling and familiar with 
the software being used to record the PHA if used. Table 3 describes suggested traits for 
a PHA scribe.   
6.7.3.3. PHA Team Member Suggested Competency Criteria: 
PHA team members must be sufficiently knowledgeable in their areas of 
expertise depending on the complexity of the process being analyzed. They should also 
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receive training on the PHA methodology being used. Table 4 describes suggested traits 
for a PHA team member.  
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Table 2: Suggested traits for PHA team leader. Adapted from [33] [36] 
Technical  Personal 
Essential   
 Formal PHA leadership training. 
 Extensive knowledge* in the PHA 
methodology used and experience* as a 
team member. 
 Extensive knowledge* and experience* 
utilizing risk assessment tools. 
 Full knowledge of current PHA regulations, 
and company requirements. 
 Understanding of process analyzed. 
 Technical ability to read technical drawings, 
specification sheets and other technical 
documentations. 
 Impartial to the facility. 
 High Endurance. 
 Possess two-way communication skills. 
 Respected. 
 Can control teams and make them reach 
consensus without force.   
 Can keep the meeting on track 
Optional  
 Experience as a scribe. 
 Relieved from other work responsibilities 
that can distract from the PHA.  
 Patient with team members 
 Organized and focused 
 Quick and open-minded thinker 
 Cooperative and friendly 
 Able to read people  
 Diplomatic 
Note: If the PHA team leader is a contractor. It is essential that his/her qualifications are verified to meet 
the minimum requirements set by the competency management program.  
*  The company’s competency management program should specify exactly what constitutes having 
“extensive knowledge and experience” for the PHA team leader. This thesis cannot stipulate specifically 
what constitutes having “extensive knowledge and experience” for the PHA team leader because each 
process has varying levels of complexity and risk in different companies and environments. However, the 
established company’s competency management program should specify exactly what having extensive 
knowledge means for the PHA team leader. This could be the number of PHA studies participated in as a 
team member, years of experience, training, tasks completed, certification or combination of all. For 
example, the company’s competency management program could specify that the team leader shall have 
participated in at least four PHA studies as a team member and one as a scribe, in addition to having 
appropriate academic background, and PHA leadership training in order to become eligible for PHA 
leadership. 
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Table 3: Suggested traits for a PHA scribe. Adapted from [33] [36]. 
Technical  Personal 
Essential *  
 Knowledgeable in the PHA methodology 
used. 
 Experience in recording PHA sessions 
whether by utilizing a specific software or 
otherwise.  
 Fluent typing skills with adequate spelling 
and grammar accuracy.   
 Attention to detail. 
 High Endurance. 
 Compatible with team leader. 
 High comprehension of speech 
  
Optional  
 Understanding of process analyzed. 
 Knowledge of technical terminology used. 
 Relieved from other work responsibilities 
that can distract from the PHA.  
 Capable of being an assistant to the team 
leader and not just a recorder.  
 High level of response 
* If the PHA scribe is a contractor. It is essential that his/her qualifications are verified to meet the minimum 
requirements set by the competency management program.  
 
Table 4: Suggested traits for a PHA team member 
Technical  Personal 
Essential   
 Sufficiently* proficient in their respective 
area of expertise.  
 Knowledgeable in applicable standards, 
regulations, and best practices applicable to 
their respective areas of expertise.  
 Able to read technical drawings and 
understand process documentation. 
 Received formal training in risk assessment 
and utilizing risk assessment tools. 
 Communicate technical issues clearly to 
team members.  
 Committed to spend the required time to 
participate in the PHA with no distractions.   
Optional  
 Knowledgeable in the PHA methodology 
used (received formal training).  
 Understanding of process analyzed 
(mandatory if member is a process engineer 
or operator) 
 
 Focused.  
 Able to express his/her opinion without 
fear of criticism. 
 Able to work in a team.  
*  The company’s competency management program should specify exactly what constitute being 
“sufficiently proficient” for each PHA team member. This thesis cannot stipulate specifically what 
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constitutes being “sufficiently proficient” for each team member because each process has varying levels 
of complexity and risk in different companies and environments. However, the established company’s 
competency management program should specify exactly what being sufficiently proficient mean for each 
team member participating in this study. This could be a position, years of experience, tasks completed, 
training, certification or combination of all. For example, the company’s competency management 
program could specify that the operator shall have at least 5 years of experience, or should be at least a 
shift supervisor.      
 
6.8. Time Allocated for PHA Team 
Another significant contributing factor to PHA quality is the time allocated for 
the PHA team to conduct the PHA. You can have the best PHA team in the world, but 
giving them a lot less time than what they require will tremendously reduce the quality 
of their analysis. Industry safety leaders such as William Ralph [37] and Professor Sam 
Mannan, members of Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center Steering Committee, 
emphasize the importance of giving enough time for the PHA team to produce quality 
PHAs. Professor Sam Mannan also advocates the need to provide the team with 
sufficient breaks as well to reduce fatigue and maintain the team’s focus [36].  
Therefore, it is exceedingly important that the auditor determines and evaluate the actual 
time it took the team to complete the actual PHA exercise, not including preparation and 
report writing, and compare it to a reasonable estimate. The number of days it took to 
complete the PHA study can be obtained by interviewing some of the team members 
with reasonable accuracy if it is backed up by emails exchanged between the team. The 
average number of hours per day, as well as the number/length of breaks could be 
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obtained in the same way. It is even better if company guidelines would require this 
information to be logged in the PHA report itself to make it easier for future audits. An 
estimate of the time required to complete a HAZOP can be obtained using chapter 13 
(Estimation of Time Needed for PHAs) of the Guidelines for Process Hazards Analysis 
(PHA, HAZOP), Hazards Identification, and Risk Analysis developed by Nigel Hyatt 
[18]. An estimate of the time required to complete a What if/Checklist can also be 
obtained using Hyatt’s guidelines. 
However, the auditor must bear in mind that these estimates are not accurate and 
in reality many other factors can affect the actual time it takes the team to complete a 
PHA, which means that deviating from the estimate is acceptable if the deviation is not 
too high. So, the PHA quality would not necessarily take a significant hit unless the team 
was given less than 70% of the estimated time. For example, if the team was only given 
165 hours compared to an estimate of 180 hours, there should not be any concern given 
the inherent inaccuracy of the estimate. However, if the team was only given 100 hours 
to complete a HAZOP which was estimated to require 180 hours, then it would be 
significantly probable that the HAZOP quality has suffered. Of course, more time 
deviation below 70% of the estimate should translate to more reduction in quality. So, 80 
hours given to the team would have more negative effects on quality compared to 100 
hours out of 180, and this should be reflected in the audit score given. 
 
  
 47 
 
7. PHA SCOPE COMPREHENSIVENESS 
 
7.1. Non-Routine Mode of Operation 
Perhaps the biggest and most dangerous gap in PHA performance is the failure to 
include non-routine mode of operation. More than 80% of process facilities do not 
perform PHAs for non-routine mode of operation [38]. Yet, a paper published by the 
Process Improvement Institute (PII) which reviewed 47 major process safety incidents 
occurring from 1987 to 2010 revealed that almost 70% of all moderate to major 
incidents occurred during non-routine mode of operation [2]. This figure was even 
confirmed by a poll sent to over 50 of PII’s clients [38]. Discussing this issue with 
another safety consulting company, which leads PHAs on a regular basis, also confirmed 
that this is a major issue in most process facilities [39], despite the fact that performing 
PHAs for all modes of operation is an OSHA PSM requirement according to OSHA’s 29 
CFR 1910.119. What makes this issue even more dangerous, is that common PHA 
methodologies employed for continuous mode of operation only identifies 5-10% of the 
potential hazardous scenarios for non-routine mode of operation [38]. This risk becomes 
even more evident when factoring the number of shutdown/startups performed by each 
facility each year, the fact that during startup/shutdown operations most safeguards 
proposed to reduce risk during continuous operation are bypassed, and that the reliance 
on operator actions is substantially increased greatly increasing human error and 
reducing reliability. This results in the increased probability of a major incident 
occurring by 30-50 times [38].  
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The auditor should verify that PHAs were conducted for non-routine modes of 
operation and should evaluate them against the same quality standards discussed 
throughout the proposed guidelines in Appendix A. There are a few points that the 
auditor should note: 
1) For evaluating time required to complete non-routine mode of operation PHAs, 
time estimated using Hyatt’s guidelines discussed in Section 6.8 must be 
multiplied by a factor of 54%. This is due to the fact non-routine modes of 
operation HAZOPs require less guidewords and therefore less time. According to 
William Bridges in his paper titled “How to efficiently perform the hazard 
evaluation (PHA) required for non-routine modes of operation (startup, 
shutdown, online maintenance)”, the total amount of meeting time spent to 
Routine 
Operation 
34% 
Maintanance 
28% 
Startup 
28% 
Non-Routine 
Batch 
6% 
Shutdown 
4% 
Figure 7: Incidents during different modes of operation (47 major incidents 
between 1987-2010). Adapted from [2]. between 1987-2010). Adapted from [2]. 
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perform routine and non-routine mode of operation PHAs is split 65% and 35%, 
respectively.  
2) The auditor should verify that appropriate PHA methodologies are utilized. 
Qualitative PHA methodologies typically used for non-routine modes of 
operations are [38]: 
(a) The 7 to 8 guidewords HAZOP, typically used for high risk/complexity 
procedures. 
(b) The 2 guidewords HAZOP, typically used for lower risk/complexity 
procedures.  
(c) The What-if method utilized or low risk/complexity procedures with well 
understood tasks and hazards. 
3) Triggers to initiate more quantitative methodologies (e.g., LOPA) for specific 
procedures should be established in corporate requirements and implemented 
during PHAs for non-routine modes of operation similar to their routine 
counterparts as discussed in section 6.5.   
 
7.2. Facility Siting 
Another common gap shared by many companies is also failing to include or 
consider facility siting (i.e., effect of potential explosions and toxic releases on nearby 
occupied buildings) in their PHA. Most facilities will do a good job in including all 
process nodes. However, they might fail to assess facility siting entirely. Addressing 
facility siting is a requirement in the USA and is driven by OSHA and EPA. Yet, some 
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facilities perform this task separately without incorporating its findings in the facility’s 
PHA studies. Auditors should verify incorporation of facility siting assessment findings 
in PHA recommendations. In addition, since facility siting assessment should be part of 
the PHA, auditors should ensure that facility siting studies are performed at least every 5 
years and incorporated in PHA revalidations [20]. This is extremely important not only 
because it reduces residual risk that went unidentified in previous PHAs, but also 
because building occupancy indices may change as well, which may result in significant 
change in the consequences and the level of risk assessed in the previous PHA studies. 
Auditors should also verify that temporary structures, such as portable buildings or 
trailers used during turnaround and inspection (T&I) for contractor occupancy, are only 
placed in safe zones defined in the facility siting assessment. During the BP Texas city 
incident, 15 contractors were fatally injured in trailers that were not placed in safe zones 
[8].  
 
7.3. Chemical Inventory    
Chemicals stored in the process are not subject to being overlooked in a PHA 
study. However, chemicals used for maintenance usually are overlooked. Improper 
storage of flammable or toxic chemicals stored in warehouses and sheds can lead to 
major incidents. A well-known one is the incident that occurred in Tianjin, China 2015. 
The explosions which originated from chemicals stored in a storage warehouse had a 
power which exceeded 20 tons of TNT [15]. So, depending on the quantity and nature of 
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the stored chemicals, a facility might be completely wiped out. Had a quality PHA been 
performed on this chemical warehouse, the risk would have been greatly reduced.  
Auditors should not only ensure that all chemical storage warehouses/buildings 
have been included in the PHA, but also maximum inventory reached for these 
chemicals should be verified through site verifications, inventory reports, and/or 
employee interviews. It is also vital to ensure that maximum chemical inventories are 
accounted for in PHA revalidations as well. A change in inventory may slip through 
existing gaps in the facility’s MOC process, especially if the chemical inventory is 
managed by a different department which may not have an engineer or qualified person. 
This is often seen in big companies where material/chemical warehouses are managed 
independently. Furthermore, in general warehouses are often perceived as low risk and 
have poor PSM implementation monitoring. 
 
7.4. Shared Processes 
Special attention must be given to shared processes and connected boundaries 
between different units in a given facility. Performing PHAs on processes like utility 
lines and flare headers that are shared among several units in a facility can be neglected 
unintentionally. When ownership of process units is segregated and the responsibility of 
performing PHAs is assigned to several PHA teams, the teams might neglect performing 
PHAs on shared processes or miss sections as a result of differently defined boundaries 
between units [39]. The auditor should verify first if references in PHA do in fact link to 
a performed PHA on the shared process. In addition, the auditor should verify that the 
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boundaries of connecting process units are similarly defined and no section of the 
facility is overlooked.  
 
7.5.  Inherently Safer Design (ISD)     
Utilizing the ISD principals to reduce risk should be a critical step in any PHA 
study. Although it is most effective during conceptual design and front end engineering 
design (FEED) [1], it should also be applied to reduce consequence severity for high 
consequence hazardous scenarios identified during initial PHA studies [31]. Although 
ISD can be applied at any time during the facility’s lifecycle, it makes more sense 
practically and financially to apply them during the design stage of the process [1]. By 
now, ISD awareness should not be an issue and auditors should pursue and verify 
implementation of ISD principals.   
An auditor should verify that the ISD principals were applied during the design 
stage for identified hazardous scenarios with severe consequences [31]. The hierarchy 
followed should be in accordance with Figure 8 shown below. 
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Elimination: Elimination of hazard. 
Intensification: Reduction in inventory of hazardous chemicals and/or process/equipment size (e.g. pipe 
diameter, vessel size). 
Substitution: Substitution of hazardous chemical with a safer one (e.g., higher flash point, less reactive 
chemicals). 
Attenuation: Reduction of hazardous conditions (e.g., pressure, temperature if flammable, dilution). 
Limitation: Reduction of consequence (e.g., reducing leak volume, reducing explosion impact) 
Simplification: Reduction of probability of error/failure.   
  
Simplification 
Limitation 
Attenuation 
Substitution 
Intensification 
Elimination 
Incident 
Likelihood 
Incident 
Severity 
Figure 8: Inherently Safer Design (ISD) principals’ hierarchy. Reprinted from [1] 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As implied throughout the thesis, it is critical that the audit team use guidelines 
similar to the ones proposed in this study as part of an overall PSM audit. Focusing on 
auditing the quality of the PHA element alone will unquestionably assist in identifying 
gaps in implementation and company policies/standards. However, solving these 
identified gaps will require looking at the bigger picture, which only can be attained 
from auditing the whole safety management system (SMS). Implementation deficiencies 
in process safety information, incident investigation, training, and mechanical integrity 
for example, will definitely have cascading effects on PHA implementation. In addition, 
implementation deficiencies in PHA quality will also have cascading effects on other 
PSM elements such as mechanical integrity, operating procedures, emergency planning 
and response. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the user/s of these proposed 
guidelines incorporate them as part of an overall PSM audit. It is also highly 
recommended that user/s of these guidelines also use their findings to propose 
recommendations that focus on improving the SMS, eliminating the identified gaps, and 
updating the internal standards and procedures of the facility to ensure continuous 
improvement. It is most frustrating to find out that all the man-hours, money, and effort 
that went into performing the monumental task of auditing the whole SMS just to find 
that the audit report merely became a document hidden on a shelf collecting dust. 
Spending the time and money to perform this audit and use its findings to close the 
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company’s SMS gaps should be seen as an investment by the facility’s executives. It will 
unquestionably save a lot of money and ensure business continuity on the long run. 
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9. FUTURE WORK 
 
The next step that follows developing these guidelines would be of course to test 
them in a pilot exercise at a chemical/hydrocarbon facility. Multiple pilots will help 
complete and refine these guidelines, and make them more practical to use. The natural 
step following those pilot exercises and improvement of guidelines is to use them to 
enhance the facility’s internal standards and procedures in order to help close identified 
gaps, develop systems that assist in making the PHA element easier to audit and monitor 
with the goal of steering the facility for continuous improvement of PHA element 
implementation.      
 
 
 57 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
1. Cameron, I.T. and R. Raman, Process Systems Risk Management. Vol. 6. 2005: 
Academic Press. 
2. Bridges, W. and T. Clark. How to efficiently perform the hazard evaluation 
(PHA) required for non-routine modes of operation (startup, shutdown, online 
maintenance). in 7th Global Congress on Process Safety. 2011. 
3. U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Williams Geismar 
Olefins Plant: Reboiler Rupture and Fire: Geismar, Louisiana: Incident Date: 
June 13, 2013: Two Fatalities, 167 Reported Injuries:. 2016. 
4. U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Chlorine release (16 
medically evaluated, community evacuated): DPC Enterprises, L.P., Glendale, 
Arizona, November 17, 2003. 2003: Washington, D.C. p. 55. 
5. U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Chlorine release, July 
20, 2003 (7 injured): contaminated antimony pentachloride exposure, July 29, 
2003 (1 killed): hydrogen fluoride release, August 13, 2003 (1 exposed, 1 
injured): Honeywell International, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana 2005. p. 106. 
6. Mannan, M.S., J. Makris, and H.J. Overman, Process Safety and Risk 
Management Regulations:  Impact on Process Industry. Supplement 1 ed. 
Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design, ed. R.G.A.a.J.J. McKetta. 
Vol. 69. 2002, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
7. Litvak, A., Energy companies study the role of human behavior in safety. 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 2014. 
8. BP Texas City Final Investigation Report. 2007, U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board. 
9. Process safety management guidelines for compliance. 1992: [Washington, 
D.C.]: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
1992. 
10. Kaszniak, M., Oversights and omissions in process hazard analyses: Lessons 
learned from CSB investigations. Process Safety Progress, 2010. 29(3): p. 264-
269. 
11. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Auditing Process Safety 
Management Systems. 1993: Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE. 
 58 
 
12. Moss, T., Auditing Offshore Safety Risk Assessments. Journal of Petroleum 
Technology, 1990. 42(10): p. 1241-1243. 
13. Crawley, F. and B. Tyler, HAZOP: Guide to Best Practice (Third Edition). 2015: 
Elsevier. 
14. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. 
2007, Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE. 
15. BBC News, China explosions: What we know about what happened in Tianjin - 
BBC News. 2015. 
16. Andrew Jacobs, J.C.H. and B. Chris, Behind Deadly Tianjin Blast, Shortcuts and 
Lax Rules. 2015. 
17. Mortimer, C., Tianjin explosion: Gigantic crater left by Chinese factory 
explosion revealed in this picture. 2016. 
18. Hyatt, N., Guidelines for process hazards analysis (PHA, HAZOP), hazards 
identification, and risk analysis. 2003: CRC press. 
19. Dunjó, J., et al., Conducting HAZOPs in continuous chemical processes: Part I. 
Criteria, tools and guidelines for selecting nodes. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 2011. 89: p. 214-223. 
20. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, in 
Guidelines for Auditing Process Safety Management Systems. 2011, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. p. 307-360. 
21. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Defining Process Safety 
Competency Requirements. 2015, New York, US: American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers. 
22. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Chemical Process 
Quantitative Risk Analysis. 2nd ed ed. CCPS guidelines series. 2000: New York : 
The Center, [2000]. 
23. Rushton, A.G., Quality Assurance of HAZOP. 1996, U.K. Health and Safety 
Executive: Sheffield, UK. 
24. Beerens, H.I., J.G. Post, and P.A. Uijt de Haag, The use of generic failure 
frequencies in QRA: the quality and use of failure frequencies and how to bring 
them up-to-date. J Hazard Mater, 2006. 130(3): p. 265-70. 
 59 
 
25. Moss, T.R. and J.E. Strutt, Data Sources for Reliability Design Analysis. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part E: Journal of 
Process Mechanical Engineering, 1993. 207(1): p. 13-19. 
26. LOPA – Layer of Protection Analysis. Process and HSE Engineering, 2011. 
27. Lowrance, W.W., Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety. 
1976. 
28. Shortreed, J., K. Dinnie, and D. Belgue. Risk criteria for public policy. in 
Proceedings of the First Biennial Conference on Process Safety and Loss 
Management. 1995. 
29. Health and Safety Executive, Initial briefing to Societal Risk Technical Advisory 
Group. 2009, Research Report, RR703. 
30. Duijm, N.J., Recommendations on the use and design of risk matrices. Safety 
Science, 2015. 76: p. 21-31. 
31. Mannan, M.S., Personal Communication. 2017. 
32. Suttinger, L.T. and C.L. Sossman, Operator Actions Within a Safety 
Instrumented Function. Conference: ISA 2002, Chicago, IL (US), 10/21/2002--
10/24/2002; Other Information: PBD: 6 Sep 2002. 2002: ; Savannah River Site 
(US). Medium: ED; Size: vp. 
33. Baybutt, P., Competency requirements for process hazard analysis (PHA) teams. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2015. 33: p. 151-158. 
34. Process safety management guidelines for compliance. 1994 (Reprinted). 1994: 
[Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, [1994]. 
35. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA Letter of Interpretation of 
PSM Standard, T.N.C. Robert Summers, Inc., Editor. 2001. 
36. Mannan, M.S., Chemical Process Safety Lecture: HAZOPs. 2015. 
37. Ralph, W., Personal Communication. 2017. 
38. Bridges, W. and M. Marshall, Necessity of Performing Hazard Evaluations 
(PHAs) of Non-normal Modes of Operation (Startup, Shutdown, & Online 
Maintenance). 2016. 
39. Nguyen, G., Personal Communication. 2017. 
 60 
 
APPENDIX A: PHA QUALITY AUDITING GUIDELINES 
 
No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1 Sources of Quality Variance 
1.1 Comprehensiveness of PHA Inputs 
1.1.1  Has the facility/company established requirements 
to include all applicable PHA inputs listed in (a) 
through (m)? 
(a) Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 
(P&IDs), 
(b) Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with 
material/energy balances, 
(c) Layout drawings, 
(d) Equipment specifications sheets, 
(e) Process description, 
(f) Incident and near miss investigation reports, 
(g) Maximum chemical inventory in storage 
facilities, 
(h) Previous PHA reports*, 
(i) Emergency work orders*, 
(j) Corrosion inspection worksheets*, 
(k) MOCs*, 
(l) Drill critiques*, 
(m) Pre-startup safety reviews action items*. 
 
* Required only during PHA revalidation. 
Sections 3 
& 6.1 
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.1.2  Did the PHA/s consider all applicable input 
sources listed in (a) through (e)? 
(a) Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 
(P&IDs), 
(b) Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with 
material/energy balances, 
(c) Layout drawings, 
(d) Equipment specifications sheets, 
(e) Process description, 
Auditor should review: 
 PHA report and verify that all applicable 
sources for input were considered in the 
report.  
 Shared processes with connected boundaries 
between different units (e.g., utility lines, 
flare headers) and verify: 
o If PHA references for shared processes do 
in fact reference to a performed PHA.      
o If PHA process node boundaries are 
identical in connecting process units and no 
section of the facility is overlooked. 
 
 
 
 
Sections 
6.1 & 7.4 
  1  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.1.3  Did the PHA/s consider all related incidents and 
near misses with medium to high risk potential 
listed in (a) through (c)? 
(a) Incidents and near misses which occurred at 
the same facility, 
(b) Incidents and near misses at other facilities 
with similar processes in the same company? 
(c) Incidents at other facilities with similar 
processes in other companies? 
Merely attaching incident reports do not qualify as 
adequate consideration. 
Auditor should also: 
 Review emergency maintenance work orders 
(EMWO), identify the ones that were issued 
following an incident, and verify that all 
incidents have been considered in the PHA. 
EMWOs would capture the occurrence of 
incidents that were not properly reported or 
investigated. 
 Review process trips/upsets investigation 
reports and verify that the ones with medium to 
high risk potential were considered in the PHA. 
Some companies do not report these as near 
misses.      
 
 
 
Section 
6.1 
  7  
 63 
 
 
No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.1.4  Did the PHA team review and consider critical 
issues identified in emergency maintenance work 
orders (EMWO) during revalidation? 
Auditor should verify if the PHA team used actual 
equipment premature failure information 
identified in EMWOs to impact their estimation of 
risk.  
 
Section 
6.1 
  1  
1.1.5  Did the PHA/s consider the maximum chemical 
inventory in nearby storage facilities? 
Auditor should verify: 
 The actual maximum chemical inventory 
reached through site verifications previous 
inventory records, future plans of increase, 
and employee interviews. 
 If maximum chemical inventory impacted 
potential consequences when estimating risk.  
 If facility siting analysis considered nearby 
hazardous chemical inventory in nearby 
storage warehouses? 
 If storage warehouses with high inventory of 
hazardous material have been included in the 
PHA as potential sources of hazard and not 
been overlooked.  
 
Sections 
6.1 
& 7.3 
  2  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.1.6  Did the PHA/s consider previous PHA reports 
during revalidation? 
Auditor should verify if issues identified during 
previous PHAs (e.g. outdated P&IDs, missing 
information, operating procedures, startup 
procedures, shutdown procedures, inventory 
discrepancy) have been rectified before 
performing the audited PHA.    
 
Sections 
6.1 and 
6.2 
  1  
1.1.7  Did the PHA/s consider corrosion inspection 
worksheets during revalidation? 
Auditor should verify if critical corrosion 
inspection worksheet findings such as current 
thickness of pipe or vessel impacted risk 
estimation. 
  
Section 
6.1 
  1  
1.1.8  Did the PHA team review previous MOCs to 
account for any residual intolerable risk during 
revalidation? 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
6.1 
  1  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.1.9  Did the PHA team review past drill critiques and 
considered their findings (e.g., emergency 
response time, fire truck access, manual isolation 
valve access) in the report during revalidation? 
Auditor should verify if the team used drill 
critique findings in risk estimation and design. 
 
  
Section 
6.1 
  1  
1.1.10  Did the PHA team review pre-startup safety 
reviews and consider unresolved action items? 
Auditor should verify if unresolved action items 
[e.g. incomplete transfer of process information, 
incomplete training of maintenance personal to 
properly maintain a safety instrumented system 
(SIS), and incomplete installation of SIS] have 
impacted the report. Verification should include 
field verification and/or interviews.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sections 
6.1 & 6.2 
  1  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.2 Quality of PHA Inputs 
1.2.1  Has the facility/company established systems, 
including items (a) through (m), which ensure 
quality of all applicable PHA inputs listed in 
question 1.1.1? 
(a) Process Safety Information (PSI) 
(b) Training and Competency Management 
(c) Mechanical Integrity 
(d) Management of Change (MOC)  
(e) Incident Reporting and Investigation 
(f) Emergency Planning and Response 
 
If these systems exist and have been audited as 
part of an overall PSM audit, scores should be 
used to influence the overall score of PHA 
quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
6.2 
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.2.2  Did the facility provide accurate and up-to-date 
PSI to the PHA team? 
Auditor should verify the question through the 
following: 
 Checking previous PHA reports for any 
comments regarding missing/inaccurate PSI 
and verifying if these were rectified prior to 
performing the audited PHA.  
 Interviewing PHA team members and 
inquiring about any missing information or 
inaccuracies identified during the PHA. 
 Interviewing process engineers, plant 
operators, and maintenance engineers and 
inquire about any missing information or 
inaccuracies they encounter regarding PSI.  
 Checking completed MOCs which needed 
PSI updates and verifying if updates were 
performed prior to the PHA.  
 Interviewing personnel and inquiring about 
any recent changes to the process and 
verifying that all these changes went through 
the MOC process and associated PSI were 
updated as necessary. 
 Reviewing any recent third party audit 
reports which audited PSI.   
 
Section 
6.2 
  8  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.3 Risk Assessment Accuracy 
1.3.1  Has the facility/company established requirements 
to ensure accuracy of risk assessments during 
PHA? 
Auditor should verify if the company 
established/adopted guidelines for using historical 
data, generic failure data, and experience to 
ensure accuracy of risk estimation.  
 
Sections 
6.3.1 & 
6.3.3 
    
1.3.2  Has the facility/company established and 
maintained an equipment failure database in order 
to use it to estimate risk to high levels of 
accuracy? 
Auditor should verify that the facility/company 
has developed their own database based on the 
facility’s equipment failure data. 
If other sources of data (i.e. historical data from 
other facilities, or generic data) were used to 
develop the database, the auditor should ensure 
that they were reviewed and modified to cater for 
differences in operational and environmental 
conditions (e.g., fluid aggressiveness, 
temperature, pressure, and vibration). 
 
 
Section 
6.3.1.1 
  2  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.3.3  If historical data was utilized from other facilities 
with similar processes to estimate probability of 
failure, has the team reviewed and modified the 
data to cater for differences in operational and 
environmental conditions (e.g., fluid 
aggressiveness, temperature, pressure, and 
vibration)? 
 
Section 
6.3.1.1 
  1  
1.3.4  Were generic failure databases utilized to estimate 
probability of failure only where no historical data 
existed?   
 
Section 
6.3.1.2 
  1  
1.3.5  If generic data were used to estimate probability 
of failure, was it reviewed and/or modified to suit 
the facility’s operational and environmental 
conditions (e.g., fluid aggressiveness, 
temperature, pressure, and vibration)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
6.3.1.2 
  1  
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No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
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(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.3.6  Was probability of failure estimates revalidated by 
the PHA team using actual failure data of the 
facility equipment during PHA revalidations? 
 
 
 
Section 
6.3.1.2 
  1  
1.3.7  Did the PHA team initially estimate the risk using 
the worst-case credible consequence for a given 
scenario without considering the effects of any 
safeguards (e.g. relief valve, level alarm, 
emergency isolation valve)? 
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1.3.8  If the team relied solely on their experience to 
estimate the risk of some given scenarios, was it 
limited to high frequency scenarios which several 
team members witnessed during their experience?  
The probability of rare events should not be 
estimated using the team’s experience only 
without relying on any other sources of data.  
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1.4 Risk Acceptance Criteria  
1.4.1  Has the facility/company developed adequate risk 
acceptance criteria for all relevant types of risk 
(e.g., human life, health, environment, and assets) 
which includes items (a) and (b)? 
(a) Maximum allowable risk per initiating event. 
(b) Maximum allowable risk per node or area 
Auditor should verify if: 
 The criteria differentiate between employee 
and societal risk (i.e., societal risk should not 
be higher than employee risk). 
 The criteria are approved and signed by 
facility/company executives.  
 The criteria are reasonable (e.g., societal risk 
should be between 10
-6
 and 10
-3
 fatality per 
person/year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
6.4 
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1.4.2  Did the facility/company develop an adequate risk 
assessment tool (e.g., risk matrix) which 
incorporates the approved risk acceptance criteria 
that meets the requirements of question 1.4.1? 
Auditor should verify that: 
 Descriptions of consequence categories 
includes at least loss of life, financial loss, 
and environmental loss.  
 Quantitative description is used to define 
probability and consequence categories. 
 Resolution of matrix is at least 4x4. 
 Ranges of frequency and consequence are 
adequate. For example, major incidents 
consequences should range from loss time 
injury to multiple fatalities. For likelihood, 
the range should be from 1 per year to at least 
10
-4
 per year.  
 Coloring of risk matrix is clearly defined in 
terms of risk acceptability, and the ALARP 
region is identified.   
 Risk acceptance criteria is defined 
quantitatively in addition to coloring.  
 The tool is approved by facility/company 
executives. 
 
 
Section 
6.4 
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1.4.3  Did the PHA team utilize an adequate risk 
assessment tool (e.g., risk matrix) which meets the 
requirements of question 1.4.2? 
 
Section 
6.4 
  3  
1.5 Initiation For More Quantitative Methodologies 
1.5.1  Has the facility/company developed criteria for 
initiating more quantitative studies, and specified 
suitable quantitative risk assessment 
methodologies for the specific initiation criterion? 
Auditor should verify that initiation triggers used 
are based on estimated consequences (major 
injury, fatality, societal injury, environmental 
toxic release, etc.), risk, complexity of the 
process, type of material/chemical processed, or a 
combination.  
 
Section 
6.5  
    
1.5.2  Did the PHA team perform a study with a suitable 
quantitative risk assessement methodology based 
on facility/company initiation criteria?   
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1.5.3  If the PHA team recommended performing a 
study with a suitable quantitative risk assessement 
methodology based on facility/company initiation 
criteria, was the recommendation closed only after 
recommnedations of the resulting study were 
implimented? 
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1.6 Safeguard Risk Effect Estimation   
1.6.1  Did the team accurately reevaluate the risk of each 
hazardous scenario identified with 
recommended/installed safeguards to 
determine/demonstrate that the proposed 
safeguards are sufficient to reduce the risk to as 
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)?  
Auditor should verify that: 
 The PHA team did not introduce invalid 
safeguards such as: 
(a) A safeguard that requires a rushed operator 
intervention unfeasible by the operator due 
to a lack of time or inaccessibility (e.g., 
isolation valve located very close to a 
leak/fire, or isolation valve which requires 
a scaffold to access);   
(b) “Operator Awareness;” 
(c) “Never had a problem with it to date;” 
(d) Using a vessel site glass with a media that 
causes fouling of glass making it difficult 
to tell true level;  
(e) Using a component from the same failed 
loop/system as a safe guard. 
 
Section 
6.6 
  3  
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  The PHA team did not reduce the risk in both 
the probability and consequence axes. A 
safeguard such as a level alarm would only 
reduce the probability, while a dike would 
reduce the consequence. 
 
     
1.6.2  Did the PHA team accurately consider operator 
action as a safeguard to implement emergency 
response procedures? 
Auditor should verify that risk was only reduced 
along the consequence axis.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
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1.6.3  If the PHA team considered operator action as a 
safeguard to control the process and return it to its 
safe parameter, have they accurately determined 
its effect on risk? 
Auditor should verify that: 
 Risk was only reduced along the probability 
axis. 
 Magnitude of reduction along the probability 
axis did not exceed a factor of 10 unless the 
team demonstrated the following: 
(a) This particular operator response is reliable 
enough to exceed a factor of 10 by 
performing LOPA or equivalent 
methodology proving that the operator action 
meets the intended safety instrumented 
function (SIF). 
(b) The operator can respond correctly to the 
alarm within the available time to return the 
process to a safe state. 
(c) The probability of human error for each 
specific case is estimated using sound human 
error evaluation techniques such as the 
Technique for human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) and the Accident Sequence 
Evaluation Program Human Reliability 
Analysis Procedure (ASEP HRA Procedure). 
 
Section 
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 (d) Environmental factors (e.g., access, control 
area environment, control layout and quality 
of displays), stress factors (e.g., shift 
schedules, response time pressure), and 
personnel factors (e.g. experience, training) 
are considered in the analysis to reduce or 
increase/decrease the nominal human error 
rates estimated through the human error 
evaluation technique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 80 
 
 
No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.7 Factors Affecting Team Performance 
1.7.1  Has the facility/company established requirements 
to include at least disciplines listed in (a) through 
(l) in a PHA team? 
(a) PHA leader; 
(b) Scribe; 
(c) Process engineer or designer; 
(d) Project engineer; 
(e) Experienced Operator; 
(f) Safety, Health, Environment expert (as 
required); 
(g) Instrument/ Safety Instrumented Systems 
(SIS) engineer (as required); 
(h) Mechanical/maintenance engineer 
knowledgeable in routine and non-routine 
maintenance procedures and tasks (as 
required); 
(i) Corrosion inspector/engineer representative 
(as required); 
(j) Instrument technician; 
(k) Maintenance/mechanical technician; 
(l) Other specialist/experts in other relevant 
disciplines (e.g., process technology; 
operating procedures; alarms; procedures; 
procurement) as required. 
Section 
6.7.2 
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1.7.2  Did the PHA team cover all required disciplines to 
ensure all hazards are identified and evaluated 
against risk acceptability criteria? 
Auditor should verify that a corrosion 
inspector/engineer, instrument technician, and 
maintenance/mechanical technician were part of 
the team at least at some point during the PHA as 
required.  
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1.7.3  Has the facility/company established and 
implemented an adequate competency 
management program that ensures the 
competency of PHA team and covers items listed 
in (a) through (m)? 
(a) Specify the roles and responsibilities of the 
PHA team members and facility 
management. 
(b) Stipulate the level of expertise required for 
team members depending on the complexity 
of the process being analyzed,  
(c) Stipulate the training material and type of 
training (e.g., classroom or on the job),  
(d) Specify the required frequency or criteria for 
refresher training, 
(e) Stipulate expertise required to reach the level 
of competency desired for each PHA team 
member (e.g. years of experience, number of 
PHA studies participated in, tasks completed, 
position, certifications, or combination of 
all),  
(f) Measure, monitor, and document 
competency of members, 
(g) Able to track training history of individuals, 
(h) Provide a snapshot of the team members’ 
competency status at the time of the report. 
Section 
6.7.3 
  2  
 83 
 
 
No. 
Question Reference 
Standard 
Status 
(MC/NI/DNE) 
Score 
(0-5) 
NF Notes/Comments 
1.7.4  Was the PHA team leader qualified per the 
requirements stipulated in the facility’s 
competency management program?   
Auditor should review the PHA team leader 
competency requirements described in the 
competency management program and verify if 
he/she meets those requirements. Table 3 in 
section 6.7.3 can be used to verify team leader 
competency if facility requirements are deemed 
inadequate.   
Section 
6.7.3 
  4  
1.7.5  Were the PHA team members and scribe qualified 
per the requirements stipulated in the facility’s 
competency management program?   
Auditor should review the PHA team members 
and scribe competency requirements described in 
the competency management program and verify 
if they meet those requirements. Tables 4 and 5 in 
section 6.7.3 can be used to verify team member 
and scribe competency if facility requirements are 
deemed inadequate.  
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1.7.6  Was the PHA team allocated sufficient time to 
complete the PHA while maintaining quality? 
Auditor should verify: 
 How much time the team actually needed to 
complete the PHA while maintaining quality. 
This information could be obtained from 
interviewing the PHA team leader since it is 
his responsibility to estimate and ask for 
sufficient time for the team. If this 
information could not be obtained from the 
PHA team leader, refer to chapter 13 
(Estimation of Time Needed for PHAs) of the 
Guidelines for Process Hazards Analysis 
(PHA, HAZOP), Hazards Identification, and 
Risk Analysis developed by Nigel Hyatt. His 
guidelines can be used to estimate the time 
required for meetings in a HAZOP study (not 
including preparation and report writing). 
Hyatt’s estimation guidelines are mainly for 
routine modes of operation. HAZOPs and 
What if/checklist performed for non-routine 
mode of operation require 54% of the time 
estimated for routine mode of operation.    
 The team was in fact allocated the time 
requested by the PHA team leader or at least 
70% of the estimated time obtained Hyatt’s 
guidelines.  
Sections 
6.8 and 
7.1 
  4  
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2       PHA Scope Comprehensiveness 
2.1 Non-Routine Mode of Operation 
2.1.1  Has the facility/company established a 
requirement to perform PHA studies for non-
routine mode of operation? 
Section 
7.1 
    
2.1.2  Did the PHA team conduct PHAs for all non-
routine modes of operation using appropriate PHA 
methodologies? 
Auditor should verify that: 
 PHAs for performed for startup, shutdown, 
non-routine batch, and maintenance modes of 
operations.  
 Appropriate PHA methodologies were 
utilized: 
(a) The 7 to 8 guidewords HAZOP, typically 
used for high risk/complexity procedures. 
(b) The 2 guidewords HAZOP, typically used 
for lower risk/complexity procedures.  
(c) The What-if method utilized or low 
risk/complexity procedures with well 
understood tasks and hazards. 
(d) More quantitative methodologies such as 
LOPA are utilized when triggered. 
 
Section 
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2.2 Facility Siting 
2.2.1  Has the facility/company established requirement 
to perform facility siting assessments as part of 
the PHA?  
 
 
Section 
7.2 
    
2.2.2  Was a facility siting assessment performed as part 
of the PHA study? 
Auditor should verify following: 
 The facility siting assessment is not merely 
attached to the PHA report. Consequences 
estimated in the PHA report should be 
influenced by findings in the siting 
assessment.  
 Facility siting assessment included storage 
facilities/warehouses. 
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2.2.3  Were recommendations resulting from the facility 
siting assessment implemented completely?  
Auditor should verify the following: 
 Recommendations of the siting assessment is 
part of the PHA report (to ensure same level 
of urgency and monitoring)  
 If facility siting is performed separately as a 
PHA recommendation, the recommendation 
should not be closed until all facility siting 
assessment recommendations are closed.  
Site verification should be performed by the 
auditor to ensure that facility siting 
recommendations were implemented (e.g., 
temporary structures, such as portable buildings or 
trailers used during turnaround and inspection 
(T&I) for contractor occupancy are only placed in 
safe zones defined in the facility siting 
assessment). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
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2.2.4  Were facility siting assessments revalidated every 
5 years along with the PHA? 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
7.2 
  1  
2.3 Inherently Safer Design (ISD) 
2.3.1  Has the facility/company established a 
requirement to utilize ISD principles to reduce 
risk during design stage PHA studies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 
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2.3.2  Did the PHA team utilize ISD principles to reduce 
severe consequences for identified hazardous 
scenarios during the design stage?  
Auditor should verify that ISD hierarchy is 
followed by the team in the correct order: 
1- Elimination: elimination of hazard. 
2- Intensification: Reduction in inventory of 
hazardous chemicals and/or 
process/equipment size (e.g. pipe diameter, 
vessel size). 
3- Substitution: Substitution of hazardous 
chemical with a safer one (e.g., higher flash 
point, less reactive chemicals). 
4- Attenuation: Reduction of hazardous 
conditions (e.g., pressure, temperature if 
flammable, dilution). 
5- Limitation: Reduction of consequence (e.g., 
reducing leak volume, reducing explosion 
impact) 
6- Simplification: Reduction of probability of 
error/failure.   
 
 
 
 
Section 
7.5 
  3  
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STANDARD STATUS: 
Meets Criteria (MC): The requirement has been properly 
designed and established including communication, training, 
measurement, verification and feedback. 
Needs Improvement (NI): Requirement does not meet criteria 
Does Not Exist (DNE): Requirement is missing/absent 
NORMALIZATION 
FACTOR (NF) 
is set to assign suitable 
weight for each aspect 
affecting PHA quality as 
some have more impact 
than others 
FACILITY/COMPANY REQUIRMENTS 
MEETING EXPECTATIONS  
Number of standards that meet criteria:  
Number of standards that need improvement:  
Number of standards that do not exist:  
Effectiveness: The extent of conformance to established criteria 
and documentation, quality of execution, degree of 
implementation and achievement of stated objective(s). 
EFFECTIVENESS SCORE: 
0 = No discernible or meaningful indication that requirements 
are even partially implemented 
1 = Minimal evidence that requirements are even partially 
implemented (significant gaps and weaknesses)  
2 = Some portion or aspect of the requirement is present, 
although major improvement is needed 
3 = Significant portion of requirement is implemented, with 
some improvements needed 
4 = Most of the requirement is implemented, with minor 
improvements needed 
5 = Standard is fully implemented 
Summary 
SCORECARD SCALE: 
0 = No implementation 
1 – 24 = Poor implementation 
25 – 49 = Mediocre implementation 
50 – 74 = Average implementation 
75 – 89 = Above average implementation 
90 – 100 = Excellent implementation 
Total:  
Total Possible = ∑(5 x NF) (Note: If a question is not 
applicable, then use NF = 0 for that specific question): 
 
 
Divide “Total” by “Total Possible” x 100:  OVERALL SCORE: 
 
